Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions

DOI10.1016/S0304-3975(03)00391-8zbMath1098.91044MaRDI QIDQ1884971

Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan

Publication date: 27 October 2004

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Modes of computation (nondeterministic, parallel, interactive, probabilistic, etc.) (68Q10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem, Online learning in online auctions, Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values, Unnamed Item, Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms, Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals, Mechanism Design, Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items, Online random sampling for budgeted settings, Online pricing for multi-type of items, When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures, Competitive auctions, Equilibria in Online Games, Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions, Clairvoyant Mechanisms for Online Auctions, Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals, Hats, auctions and derandomization, Auctions with online supply, Learning in Repeated Auctions

Cites Work

• Online algorithms. The state of the art
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• On the existence of equilibria in noncooperative optimal flow control
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