Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001zbMath1078.91007OpenAlexW2123396968MaRDI QIDQ1885425

Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions ⋮ Mediators in position auctions ⋮ All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction ⋮ Undivide and Conquer: On Selling a Divisible and Homogeneous Good ⋮ Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies ⋮ Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

Cites Work

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• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

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