Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00153-2zbMath1083.91042MaRDI QIDQ1885428

Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Byzantine agreementIncomplete informationImperfect monitoringRepeated gamesCommunicationCompletely revealing equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence ⋮ Secure message transmission on directed networks ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network

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