Belief-based equilibrium
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Publication:1885429
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00152-0zbMath1077.91009MaRDI QIDQ1885429
Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
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- Self-Calibrating Priors Do Not Exist
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- The Well-Calibrated Bayesian
- Asymptotic calibration
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- Any Inspection is Manipulable
- Compatible Measures and Merging
- Calibration with Many Checking Rules
- A general class of adaptive strategies
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