Belief-based equilibrium

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00152-0zbMath1077.91009MaRDI QIDQ1885429

Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

LearningCalibrationEquilibriumRationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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