Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
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Publication:1885431
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00180-5zbMath1077.91010MaRDI QIDQ1885431
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (6)
Analogy-based expectation equilibrium ⋮ Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium ⋮ Rational belief hierarchies ⋮ Adaptation and complexity in repeated games ⋮ Bargaining with history-dependent preferences ⋮ Categorizing others in a large game
Cites Work
- Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Finite automata equilibria with discounting
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
- Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games
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