Individually rational pure strategies in large games

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00142-8zbMath1083.91011MaRDI QIDQ1885432

William G. Stanford

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Bounded rationalityRepeated gamesFolk TheoremIndividual rationalityApproximate equilibriumMinimax payoffsPure strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

A family of identities related to zero-sum and team games

Cites Work

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