Student admissions and faculty recruitment

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2004.03.011zbMath1073.91057OpenAlexW1997300850MaRDI QIDQ1885915

Mourad Baïou

Publication date: 12 November 2004

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2004.03.011

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transversal (matching) theory (05D15) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

Improving the Chilean College Admissions System ⋮ Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings ⋮ Online 2-stage stable matching ⋮ How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates ⋮ Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism ⋮ Equitable representation and recruitment

Cites Work

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• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• Graphs and Marriages
• Of Stable Marriages and Graphs, and Strategy and Polytopes
• The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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