Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.005zbMath1099.91021OpenAlexW2093644609MaRDI QIDQ1886752

Paul Rhode, Mark Stegeman

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.005

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations ⋮ Economic Darwinism ⋮ Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory

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