Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2003.12.004zbMath1092.91059OpenAlexW3122049107MaRDI QIDQ1887441

David Feldman, Russell S. Winer

Publication date: 26 November 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric informationLikelihood ratioMonotone

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Related Items (1)

Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes

Cites Work

• Competitive signalling
• Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes
• Unnamed Item

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