Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2003.12.002zbMath1091.91051OpenAlexW3123428892MaRDI QIDQ1887442

David Feldman

Publication date: 26 November 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric informationMonotone likelihood ratio

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Related Items (1)

Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes

Cites Work

• Competitive signalling
• Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes
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