Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
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Publication:1887541
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.005zbMath1099.91004OpenAlexW1995966721MaRDI QIDQ1887541
Publication date: 22 November 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.005
Related Items (4)
Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ The structure of unstable power mechanisms ⋮ Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions ⋮ A stability index for local effectivity functions
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- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
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- Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
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