How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
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Publication:1887542
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.007zbMath1140.91348OpenAlexW2045338826MaRDI QIDQ1887542
Publication date: 22 November 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.007
Related Items (8)
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem ⋮ Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation ⋮ Is it ever safe to vote strategically? ⋮ Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view ⋮ Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey ⋮ Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions ⋮ Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis ⋮ How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
Cites Work
- A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A variance method in combinatorial number theory
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