How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.007zbMath1140.91348OpenAlexW2045338826MaRDI QIDQ1887542

Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 22 November 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.007

zbMATH Keywords

Coalitional manipulabilityImpartial cultureScoring rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem ⋮ Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation ⋮ Is it ever safe to vote strategically? ⋮ Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view ⋮ Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey ⋮ Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions ⋮ Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis ⋮ How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election

Cites Work

• A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A variance method in combinatorial number theory

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