Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.002zbMath1077.91035OpenAlexW2150983670MaRDI QIDQ1887543

Flip Klijn, Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Estela Sánchez

Publication date: 22 November 2004

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

MatchingManipulationEndowments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Bribe-proof rules in the division problem ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Manipulation through bribes
• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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