Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof

DOI10.1007/s001820400168zbMath1097.91023OpenAlexW1972942694MaRDI QIDQ1889758

Dries Vermeulen, Mathijs Jansen, John Hillas, Jos A. M. Potters

Publication date: 9 December 2004

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400168

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumStable setsAdmissibility of strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Related Items (1)

Stability of fixed points of set-valued mappings and strategic stability of Nash equilibria

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