Decision theoretic analysis of pollutant emission monitoring procedures

DOI10.1007/BF02031725zbMath0823.90021MaRDI QIDQ1890647

Ruldolf Avenhaus

Publication date: 25 October 1995

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

statistical decision makingenvironmental agencyinspection in environmental policypoint sources of pollution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Optimal Data Verification Tests
• A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game

This page was built for publication: Decision theoretic analysis of pollutant emission monitoring procedures