A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
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Publication:1890912
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80018-1zbMath0833.90135MaRDI QIDQ1890912
Publication date: 28 May 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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