Subjective games and equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1890913
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80019-3zbMath0833.90143MaRDI QIDQ1890913
Publication date: 28 May 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
strategic interactionsubjective gamesmulti-arm bandit gamesrepeated Cournot oligopoly gamessubjective Nash and correlated equilibria
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items
On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions ⋮ A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies ⋮ Large strategic dynamic interactions ⋮ Equilibrium learning in simple contests ⋮ Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships ⋮ Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals ⋮ Truth and trust in communication: experiments on the effect of a competitive context ⋮ Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium ⋮ Subjective reasoning -- solutions ⋮ Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information ⋮ Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs ⋮ Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games ⋮ Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games ⋮ Limits to rational learning ⋮ Subjective Equilibria Under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty for Dynamic Games ⋮ Can you guess the game you are playing? ⋮ Using counterfactuals in knowledge-based programming ⋮ Ellsberg games ⋮ Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium ⋮ LEARNING TO FACE STOCHASTIC DEMAND ⋮ LEARNING TO PLAY BEST RESPONSE IN DUOPOLY GAMES ⋮ Problem solving by heterogeneous agents ⋮ Information in Continuous Time Decision Models with Many Agents ⋮ Learning and self-confirming long-run biases ⋮ Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice ⋮ Convergence of Bayesian learning to general equilibrium in mis-specified models.
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- Weak and strong merging of opinions
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Internal correlation in repeated games
- Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
- Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Compatible Measures and Merging
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
