Characterizing solutions of supermodular games: Intuitive comparative statics, and unique equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF01213650zbMath0833.90133OpenAlexW1973232904MaRDI QIDQ1891398

Patrick DeGraba

Publication date: 31 May 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213650

zbMATH Keywords

supermodular gamesupper and a lower bound on equilibrium points

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (2)

Inequalities for composite functions on a lattice ⋮ Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Comparative statics in non-cooperative games via transfinitely iterated play
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

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