A bargaining model with players' perceptions on the retractability of offers

DOI10.1007/BF01083170zbMath0826.90142MaRDI QIDQ1891666

Abhinay Muthoo

Publication date: 14 June 1995

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining gamecontinuum of perfect equilibriaretractable offersRubinstein's bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Bargaining without commitment
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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