On the difficulty of making social choices

DOI10.1007/BF01083171zbMath0826.90002MaRDI QIDQ1891667

Hannu Nurmi

Publication date: 14 June 1995

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexityrough setsNP-completenesscomputer simulationuncovered setBanks setsolution conceptsCopeland winnersmaking social choices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Condorcet's paradox
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Choosing from a tournament
• Social choice and computational complexity
• Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Rough classification
• Rough sets
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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