Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)00696-8zbMath0834.90143OpenAlexW1983894317MaRDI QIDQ1892587

Roberto Serrano

Publication date: 1995

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00696-8

zbMATH Keywords

prenucleoluspartial agreementsbilateral negotiationsconsistency-based multilateral bargaining gamedecentralized negotiations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (22)

A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems ⋮ Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes ⋮ A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules ⋮ Extended proportionality in division problems with multiple references ⋮ Reinterpreting the kernel ⋮ A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation ⋮ One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable ⋮ Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. ⋮ Divide and choose: an informationally robust strategic approach to bankruptcy problems ⋮ A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references ⋮ Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets ⋮ The nucleolus of large majority games ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players ⋮ NON-COOPERATIVE AND AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE AVERAGE LEXICOGRAPHIC VALUE ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds ⋮ Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ From jungle to civilized economy: the power foundation of exchange economy equilibrium ⋮ A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems

Cites Work

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• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• Bargaining problems with claims
• Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case
• The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Multilateral Bargaining
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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