On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten

DOI10.1007/BF01258199zbMath0829.90151MaRDI QIDQ1893188

Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 27 July 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02)

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The chain store paradox
• Agreeing to disagree
• A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
• An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Non-cooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Sequential Equilibria
• Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction: The Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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