Representation of finite action large games

DOI10.1007/BF01258201zbMath0835.90138MaRDI QIDQ1893191

Kali P. Rath

Publication date: 3 July 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriafinite action large games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items

Nash equilibria in large games ⋮ Large games with countable characteristics ⋮ Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities ⋮ Rationalizability and mixed strategies in large games ⋮ A remark on the measurability of large games

Cites Work

• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• Indivisible commodities and general equilibrium theory
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• Equilibrium Points of Nonatomic Games Over a Banach Space
• On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games With a Nonmetrizable Action Space and Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item