Two-person game forms guaranteeing the stability against commitment and delaying tactics

DOI10.1007/BF01258202zbMath0829.90150MaRDI QIDQ1893192

Nikolai S. Kukushkin

Publication date: 3 July 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

existence of a Nash equilibriumstruggle for leadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items

Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms

Cites Work

• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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