Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1013zbMath0829.90136OpenAlexW1970502601MaRDI QIDQ1893206

Andreas Blume, Joel Sobel

Publication date: 3 July 1995

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1013

zbMATH Keywords

games of communicationcommunication-proof equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (7)

Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences ⋮ Informal communication ⋮ Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria

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