Bidding off the wall: Why reserve prices may be kept secret

DOI10.1006/JETH.1995.1021zbMath0829.90046OpenAlexW1977405592MaRDI QIDQ1893214

Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date: 3 July 1995

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1021

zbMATH Keywords

common-value auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Sequentially optimal auctions ⋮ Optimal starting price for eBay-like online auctions ⋮ No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices ⋮ Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers ⋮ The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle ⋮ Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: An empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden

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