Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
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Publication:1893371
DOI10.1006/GAME.1995.1010zbMath0835.90002OpenAlexW2003411444MaRDI QIDQ1893371
Anil Arya, Richard A. Young, Jonathani Glover
Publication date: 28 April 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1010
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Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
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