Social norms and random matching games
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Publication:1893776
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1006zbMath0829.90143OpenAlexW2092671978MaRDI QIDQ1893776
Andrew Postlewaite, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara
Publication date: 19 July 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1006
Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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