Perfect Bayesian implementation

DOI10.1007/BF01212327zbMath0835.90003MaRDI QIDQ1893789

Sandro Brusco

Publication date: 13 July 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumperfect Bayesian equilibriaimcomplete information extensive form gamesocial choice sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Enriching information to prevent bank runs ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments ⋮ Weak implementation ⋮ Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games

Cites Work

• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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