Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement

DOI10.1006/GAME.1995.1032zbMath0831.90001OpenAlexW2009553093MaRDI QIDQ1896676

Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 18 February 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/95geb-ratifiable-mechanisms.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designtwo-stage processlearning from disagreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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