Evolution in mechanisms for public projects

DOI10.1007/BF01212488zbMath0831.90039OpenAlexW2073465339MaRDI QIDQ1896682

Akihiko Matsui, Roger D. Lagunoff

Publication date: 4 September 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212488

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingvoluntary contributionbinary decision mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects ⋮ Network formation and social coordination

Cites Work

• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games

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