Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01212494zbMath0831.90038OpenAlexW3125358639MaRDI QIDQ1896687

P. Mahenc, Marcel Boyer, Michel Moreaux, Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publication date: 18 February 1996

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212494

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information in location theorymonotonic signaling gameprice competition stagesequential location stage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

Related Items

Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information ⋮ Sequential competitive location on networks

Cites Work

• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information
• Competition of Firms: Discriminatory Pricing and Location
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"