Perfect equilibria of a model of \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining
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Publication:1896695
DOI10.1007/BF01243155zbMath0837.90138OpenAlexW2053036930MaRDI QIDQ1896695
Vijay Krishna, Roberto Serrano
Publication date: 4 September 1995
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01243155
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