Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions

DOI10.1007/BF01243157zbMath0832.90023OpenAlexW2008605991WikidataQ56658238 ScholiaQ56658238MaRDI QIDQ1896697

John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad

Publication date: 22 October 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01243157

zbMATH Keywords

common valueNash bidding theorysecond-price common value auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation. ⋮ Compensating for the winner's curse: Experimental evidence ⋮ An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information ⋮ EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large

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