Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief
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Publication:1896787
DOI10.1007/BF01048352zbMath0825.03015OpenAlexW4245696171MaRDI QIDQ1896787
Publication date: 28 November 1995
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01048352
Related Items (24)
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Cites Work
- Probabilistic semantics objectified: I. Postulates and logics
- Probabilistic semantics objectified: II. Implication in probabilistic model sets
- On a new axiomatic theory of probability
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
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