Collusion, discounting and dynamic games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1043zbMath0835.90141OpenAlexW2089485009MaRDI QIDQ1897324

Prajit K. Dutta

Publication date: 27 August 1995

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4a1cd28033de7c243a4ec2e5499dce9f659d48cf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesrepeated gamespatiencesustainability of Pareto-optimal outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions ⋮ Cooperation in the commons ⋮ Switching costs in frequently repeated games. ⋮ Oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets ⋮ Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information

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