A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
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Publication:1897330
DOI10.1007/BF01238776zbMath0831.90045OpenAlexW2093201129MaRDI QIDQ1897330
Angelo Antoci, Pier Luigi Sacco
Publication date: 18 February 1996
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01238776
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (6)
Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis ⋮ Supervise me if you can. Relational feelings, incentive pays and supervisory violations ⋮ Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics ⋮ On the persistence of corruption ⋮ Optimal dynamic law enforcement ⋮ Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy
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- A note on competitive bribery games
- Asymmetric information in competitive bribery games
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
- Applications of centre manifold theory
- Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
- Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
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