Geometric versions of finite games: Prisoner's dilemma, entry deterrence and a cyclical majority paradox

DOI10.1007/BF01240040zbMath0831.90130OpenAlexW2001912299MaRDI QIDQ1897342

Vicki Knoblauch

Publication date: 27 August 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240040

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmaentry deterrencelocation gamecyclical majority paradoxgeometric versions of finite, two-person games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• Non-existence of Equilibrium for the Two-dimensional Three-firms Location Problem

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