On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games

DOI10.1007/BF01240042zbMath0835.90134MaRDI QIDQ1897346

Raymond C. Battalio, Patsy Van Huyck, Sondip Mathur, John B. Van Huyck

Publication date: 27 August 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

adaptive learningdynamical systems approachhuman behaviorsymmetric bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

When learning meets salience ⋮ (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games ⋮ Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games ⋮ Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat ⋮ Prudence, justice, benevolence, and sex: Evidence from similar bargaining games ⋮ Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games ⋮ On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict ⋮ No switchbacks: Rethinking aspiration-based dynamics in the ultimatum game ⋮ Focal points and bargaining

Uses Software

• Mathematica

Cites Work

• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Do people exploit their bargaining power! An experimental study
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• The Evolution of Conventions
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