The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
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Publication:1897505
DOI10.1007/BF00179982zbMath0837.90009OpenAlexW1963580802MaRDI QIDQ1897505
Publication date: 4 September 1995
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00179982
Related Items (14)
Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria ⋮ On combining implementable social choice rules ⋮ Nash implementation of the majority rule ⋮ Nash implementation via hyperfunctions ⋮ Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. ⋮ Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution ⋮ Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges ⋮ Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity ⋮ Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems ⋮ Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
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