Acyclic social choice from finite sets

DOI10.1007/BF00179983zbMath0837.90003OpenAlexW2080712831MaRDI QIDQ1897506

Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 12 May 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00179983

zbMATH Keywords

core of simple gamesacyclic preference aggregation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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