Automata, repeated games and noise
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1899105
DOI10.1007/BF00184645zbMath0837.90140OpenAlexW2058674890MaRDI QIDQ1899105
Martin A. Nowak, Esam El-Sedy, Karl Sigmund
Publication date: 13 May 1996
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00184645
Related Items
Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators ⋮ On calculating the Krohn-Rhodes decomposition of automata ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence ⋮ Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence? ⋮ Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations ⋮ Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game ⋮ Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons ⋮ Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift? ⋮ Iterated symmetric three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ The effect of noise and average relatedness between players in iterated games ⋮ The payoff matrix of repeated asymmetric \(2\times 2\) games ⋮ Two population three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games ⋮ Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence ⋮ Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Evolution of cooperation facilitated by reinforcement learning with adaptive aspiration levels ⋮ Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat ⋮ On the coexistence of cooperators, defectors and conditional cooperators in the multiplayer iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games ⋮ Combined trust model based on evidence theory in iterated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ A theoretical analysis of temporal difference learning in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection? ⋮ Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy
This page was built for publication: Automata, repeated games and noise
