Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge

DOI10.1007/BF01048618zbMath0837.90148OpenAlexW2068479477WikidataQ114694099 ScholiaQ114694099MaRDI QIDQ1903085

Gian Aldo Antonelli, Cristina Bicchieri

Publication date: 13 May 1996

Published in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01048618

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgetheory revisionperfect informationbackwards induction elquilibriumfinite, extensive form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Knowledge representation (68T30)

Related Items (5)

Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality ⋮ Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information ⋮ On expressing maximum information in extensive games ⋮ Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies ⋮ From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction

Cites Work

• On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
• Agreeing to disagree
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Unnamed Item

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