On the revision of probabilistic belief states
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Publication:1903584
DOI10.1305/ndjfl/1040308833zbMath0844.03016OpenAlexW2047748361MaRDI QIDQ1903584
Publication date: 27 August 1996
Published in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1040308833
belief revisionbelief changeiterated revisionconditionalizationPopper functionsnonstandard conditional probability functionsprobabilistic ordinal conditional functionsrevision of probabilistic states of belief
Other nonclassical logic (03B60) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Knowledge representation (68T30)
Related Items (6)
Inter-definability of Horn contraction and Horn revision ⋮ A unified model of qualitative belief change: a dynamical systems perspective ⋮ Revising beliefs on the basis of evidence ⋮ Conditional probability in the light of qualitative belief change ⋮ Probabilistic dynamic belief revision ⋮ A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states
Cites Work
- Theory contraction through base contraction
- On the logic of theory change: safe contraction
- Two modellings for theory change
- On probabilistic representation of non-probabilistic belief revision
- Theory revision and probability
- In defense of base contraction
- The logic of conditionals. An application of probability to deductive logic
- Representational of conditional probabilities
- Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment
- Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework
- Conditional logics of normality: A modal approach
- Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs
- Steady magnetohydrodynamic flow of an incompressible viscous fluid involving an ignorable co-ordinate
- On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
- Some theorems in the metric theory of diophantine approximation
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