Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient?

DOI10.1007/BF01585604zbMath0837.76070OpenAlexW2014533965MaRDI QIDQ1904838

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 19 May 1996

Published in: Stochastic Hydrology and Hydraulics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01585604

zbMATH Keywords

probabilityNash equilibrianon-cooperative game theorystatisticseconomicscompliancewhistle-blowing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Hydrology, hydrography, oceanography (86A05) Stochastic analysis applied to problems in fluid mechanics (76M35) Meteorology and atmospheric physics (86A10)

Related Items (2)

Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient? ⋮ How penalty affects enforcement of environmental regulations

Cites Work

• Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient?
• Non-cooperative games
• Consistent detection of a monotonic trend superposed on a stationary time series
• Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing Scatterplots
• Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Nonparametric Tests Against Trend
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