Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms

DOI10.1007/BF01243037zbMath0840.90133MaRDI QIDQ1905052

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 13 February 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondencesNash-consistenttwo-player game forms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

The structure of unstable power mechanisms ⋮ On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. ⋮ Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms ⋮ A stability index for local effectivity functions ⋮ Tight and effectively rectangular game forms: A Nash solvable class ⋮ Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability ⋮ Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.

Cites Work

• Stable extensive game forms with perfect information
• A note of tight extensive game forms
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Strongly consistent game forms
• Strongly consistent two-player game forms
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms