Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems

DOI10.1007/BF01243039zbMath0843.90139MaRDI QIDQ1905054

Hiroo Sasaki

Publication date: 19 August 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationaxiomatic-characterizationscore of assignment problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (17)

Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder) ⋮ The stable fixtures problem with payments ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems ⋮ The pairwise egalitarian solution. ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations ⋮ Consistency in one-sided assignment problems ⋮ Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices ⋮ An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets ⋮ On the Owen set of transportation situations ⋮ Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets ⋮ Impossibilities for roommate problems ⋮ Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems ⋮ On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

Cites Work

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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