Bayesian learning behaviour and the stability of equilibrium forecasts

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(95)92714-ZzbMath0844.90128OpenAlexW1996096760MaRDI QIDQ1905059

Sudhir A. Shah

Publication date: 16 January 1996

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(95)92714-z

zbMATH Keywords

learningBayesian learningrational expectationsstochastic gamesstochasticintertemporal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items

Asymptotic properties of equilibrium forecasts in Bayesian learning models

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