Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1906019
DOI10.1007/BF00179100zbMath0843.90007OpenAlexW1970606456MaRDI QIDQ1906019
Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier, Lainé, Jean
Publication date: 25 February 1996
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00179100
Related Items (22)
Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes ⋮ Rational stability of choice functions ⋮ Hyper-stable collective rankings ⋮ Deriving weights from general pairwise comparison matrices ⋮ Tight bounds on 3-team manipulations in randomized death match ⋮ Symmetric maximal Condorcet domains ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates ⋮ On two new social choice correspondences. ⋮ Representation in majority tournaments ⋮ Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium ⋮ A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case ⋮ Self-selective social choice functions ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ Rank-based choice correspondences ⋮ Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates ⋮ Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox ⋮ Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency ⋮ Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
This page was built for publication: Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
