On the complexity of repeated principal agent games

DOI10.1007/BF01212179zbMath0840.90142MaRDI QIDQ1906023

In-Koo Cho

Publication date: 6 February 1996

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriuminfinitely repeated principal agent game without discountingsingle threshold rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players